This paper investigates the e¤ect of the 2008-9 …nancial crisis on …rms' employment composition decision when it is possible to choose between permanent and …xed-term workers. We use linked employer-employee data for the universe of private sector …rms in Portugal, and exploit precrisis variation in …nancial vulnerability across industries for identi…cation. We …nd that …rms in more …nancially constrained industries hire a larger proportion of …xed-term workers with respect to permanent workers after the 2008-9 crisis, relative to less …nancially vulnerable …rms. At the worker-level, workers hired by …rms in industries that require signi…cant external …nancing are more likely to be hired with a …xed-term contract after the crisis than comparable workers hired by other …rms. Our results suggest that the crisis induced …nancially constrained …rms to use the more ‡exible …xed-term contracts more intensively.
Introduction
The global …nancial crisis of 2008-9 has sparked renewed interest -both in academic and in policy circles -in understanding the cyclicality of employment and, in particular, the link between …nancial constraints, credit availability and employment. Recent research has shown that …nancing constraints a¤ect …rm-level employment decisions (Benmelech et al., 2011) , and that …rms which borrowed from less healthy banks or that tightened debt capacity in the period preceding the crisis experienced a signi…cantly larger fall in employment in the aftermath of the …nancial crisis (see Chodorow Labor market responses to the crisis have been large in European labor markets, characterized by a dual structure where ‡exible …xed-term contracts coexist with permanent contracts with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). However, evidence on the e¤ects of …nancial constraints, and in particular of the recent crisis, on …rms'decisions regarding the composition of employment and the mix between …xed-term and permanent workers is very scant.
We use employer-employee data for the universe of private sector …rms and workers in Portugal, and exploit the e¤ect of the 2008-9 crisis on …rms with di¤erential precrisis dependence on external …nance as a quasi-natural experiment. We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi…cation strategy to study the e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires at the …rm level. We also estimate, at the worker-level, how …rms' …nancing constraints a¤ect the probability of a worker being hired with a temporary contract after the crisis. 2 Portugal o¤ers a good setting to study the use of …xed-term contracts as they represent a signi…cant share of total employment, averaging 15 percent over the period, one of the largest shares in the EU.
Importantly, strict EPL for permanent workers is accompanied by lax regulation of …xed-term employment. 3 Understanding the e¤ect of …nancial constraints on …rms'choice between …xed-term and permanent contracts when hiring new workers is important given existing evidence that an increased use of …xed-term contracts has several adverse e¤ects. These include increased employment volatility, lower wages of temporary workers as unions tend to protect the interests of permanent workers in the wage bargaining, and lower labor mobility due to higher uncertainty. Moreover, higher turnover rates of …xed-term workers may reduce investment in …rm-speci…c human capital and …rms' provision of training, with potential negative e¤ects on labor productivity (see e.g., Dolado et al., 2002) .
We …nd that …rms in industries with higher precrisis dependence on external …nance increased their share of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires after the crisis, relative to less …nancially constrained …rms. We control for growth opportunities (as in Fisman and Love, 2007) and account for …rms'unobserved characteristics, which absorb any systematic di¤erences across …rms with di¤erent degree of …nancial dependence, and for aggregate trends. Our results are robust to alternative measures of …nancial vulnerability -such as the Rajan and Zingales (1998) external …nance dependence measure, the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size-age index of …nancial constraints and precrisis reliance on short-term debt -and for di¤erent dependent variables to measure the share of …xed-term hires and employment within a …rm. 4 At the worker-level, we …nd that workers hired by …rms in …nancially vulnerable industries are more likely to be hired with a …xed-term contract after the crisis, relative to comparable workers hired by …nancially unconstrained …rms. These results control for workers'observable and unobservable characteristics. Our …ndings suggest that as a result of …nancing constraints and increased uncertainty, …rms in more …nancially dependent industries increased their relative demand for the more ‡exible …xed-term employment contracts after the crisis.
Our results can be interpreted within a framework such as Caggese and Cuñat (2008) .
Assuming …xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but the latter are more productive, …nancing frictions have two opposing e¤ects on the composition of employment. On the one hand, …nancially constrained …rms require higher productivity to increase the value of internally generated funds, leading to an increased demand for the more productive permanent workers. On the other hand, increased uncertainty and expectation of future …nancing constraints lead to higher demand for the more ‡exible gap between permanent and …xed-term contracts.
…xed-term workers. Our …nding that …nancially constrained …rms increased the share of …xed-term hires after the 2008-9 crisis suggests that they value more highly the ‡exibility of these workers to adjust future employment without incurring signi…cant …ring costs.
This is particularly relevant in European labor markets where permanent workers are highly protected while …xed-term contracts have mild dismissal regulations.
The linked employer-employee data (LEED) that we use has unusually detailed information, including the workers' gender, age, education, occupation, hours of work, earnings, hiring date in the …rm, and importantly for this study, the type of contract of employment: whether …xed-term or open-ended. Firm-level information includes total sales, total employment, industry, location, number of establishments, legal and ownership structures.
To identify credit supply e¤ects, we use industry-level measures of external …nance dependence, following the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size-age index of …nancial constraints, …rms'reliance on short-term debt; as well as asset tangibility, as in Braun (2003) , and access to buyer-supplier credit, following Fisman and Love (2003) . These measures are computed from …rms'balance sheet and employer-employee data over the period that precedes the crisis, to avoid changes in …rm behavior after the crisis to a¤ect the industry measures of …nancial vulnerability.
By exploiting cross-industry di¤erences in precrisis …nancial vulnerability measures, which are intrinsic characteristics of an industry and exogenously determined from the perspective of individual …rms, we circumvent identi…cation concerns in this type of study of disentangling supply-side from demand-side changes in the credit market in response to the crisis. To provide an additional test of our identi…cation, we use the 2001 crisis that originated in the ICT sector, and …nd no statistically signi…cant relation between …nancial vulnerability and the relative use of …xed-term employment contracts after the crisis. Our results about the e¤ects of the 2008-9 crisis on …xed-term employment within …rms are thus consistent with the role of shocks to credit supply and …nancial constraints.
Our …ndings have important policy implications. Empirical research has found that …xed-term workers earn lower wages and have repeated spells of unemployment. The …nding that the use of these contracts increased after the crisis suggests on the one hand that their availability allowed …rms to continue to hire in an uncertain environment given their ‡exibility. On the other hand, it may uncover additional costs of the shock with potential long-term e¤ects in terms of decreased accumulation of human capital and productivity. This is particularly relevant in labor markets characterized by a dual employment structure.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the data used, the construction of the main variables and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the results on the e¤ect of …nancing constraints on employment composition within …rms after the crisis, and on workers'probability of a …xed-term employment contract. Section 5 discusses the interpretation and implications of our results. The last section concludes.
Related literature
This paper is related to recent studies on how …nancial shocks a¤ect employment decisions of …rms. Chodorow-Reich (2014), uses employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the borrowing history of …rms that accessed the syndicated loan market, to study the e¤ect of bank lending frictions during the 2008-9 crisis on employment. He …nds that …rms which had borrowed from less healthy …nancial institutions before the crisis had lower probability of obtaining a loan after the crisis and reduced employment by more, relative to …rms that borrowed from healthier lenders before the crisis. Greenstone et al. (2014) …nd that the withdrawal of lending to small …rms accounted for statistically signi…cant negative e¤ects on U.S. county-level employment after the 2008-9 crisis. These results are consistent with the idea that smaller …rms are more vulnerable to credit supply constraints due to problems of asymmetric information and reduced transparency (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) . to study transitions from employment to unemployment at the worker-level during the 2008-9 crisis. They …nd that the probability of becoming unemployed during the …nancial crisis is higher for workers in industries with high external …nance dependence, relative to those in industries with low dependence.
Our paper is distinct from previous studies given our focus on the e¤ect of the crisis on the relative use of …xed-term versus permanent workers at the …rm-level, rather than on total employment e¤ects. We also investigate the e¤ect of …nancing constraints on the probability of a worker being hired with a …xed-term contract following the crisis. The main contribution of this paper is thus to study how …nancing constraints a¤ect …rms' decision to hire …xed-term or permanent workers following shocks to credit supply. This is of particular importance given rigidities in European labor markets.
Previous research has studied how employment protection a¤ects employment dynamics, and in particular the use of …xed-term and permanent employment contracts (e.g.
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1992). Focussing predominantly on Europe, where reforms to labor laws regulating …xed-term contracts allowed such studies, empirical research has found that …xed-term employment absorbs a higher share of output volatility and increases overall employment volatility. The e¤ects on unemployment are found to be largely ambiguous (see e.g., Blanchard Those studies do not address the link between …nancing constraints and …rms'relative use of …xed-term contracts. As such, our paper is more closely related and complements the results in Caggese and Cuñat (2008) , who study the interaction between …nancing constraints and the employment decision of …rms to hire …xed-term or permanent workers.
The authors develop a model in which …nancing constraints are an important determinant of the optimal mix between …xed-term and permanent employment. They test the model's predictions empirically using survey data for a sample of small and medium Italian manufacturing …rms from 1995 to 2000. Their measure of …nancing constraints is based on qualitative survey answers where …rms self-declare as …nancially constrained.
We instead exploit variation across industries in external …nance dependence and the 2008-9 …nancial crisis as a quasi-experiment. We identify a causal link between …rms'…n-ancing conditions and the share of …xed-term hiring contracts, using data for the universe of private sector …rms.
3 Data and methodology
Data
We investigate how the global …nancial crisis of 2008-9 and the subsequent …nancing constraints a¤ect …rms' decision to hire temporary or permanent workers. The main data source used in this paper is the Portuguese linked employer-employee data Quadros de Pessoal (QP), for the period from 2002 through 2012. These data have been collected annually since the 1980s by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The data include information on all private sector …rms that employ at least one worker, and on all of their plants and all of their employees. Firms are required by law to answer the survey and to have it publicly available at the workplace. This ensures a high degree of coverage and reliability of the data. Each …rm and each worker has a unique registration number which allows them to be traced over time.
Firm-level information includes the …rm's year of creation, industry, region, total number of workers, number of establishments, sales volume, legal structure and ownership type (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign). Our analysis and Lalé (2016) establish that the reduction in hours per worker following the 2008-9 crisis is largely driven by changes in the part-time employment share. We instead study …rms' decision to hire …xed-term workers following the crisis as they o¤er ‡exibility to adjust future employment. In the Portuguese economy both …xed-term and permanent workers are predominantly on full-time jobs (over 95 percent of the total during the period).
considers …rms in the manufacturing and services sectors. Information on workers includes gender, age, schooling, level of skill, occupation, monthly hours of work (normal and overtime), earnings, hiring date in the …rm, date of the last promotion and type of employment contract. Importantly for this study, the variable "type of employment contract" allows us to identify whether the worker is employed with a permanent (openended) or with a …xed-term contract; this variable has been collected since 2000. We use the terms "temporary" and "…xed-term" interchangeably throughout the paper. . 6 Despite the amendments to the labor law, there have been no signi…cant changes regarding …xed-term or permanent contracts during the period covered by our analysis; in particular in the maximum duration, severance pay, or procedures to terminate a …xed-term contract. By law, …xed-term employment contracts are intended to ful…l …rms' temporary work needs and in general cannot exceed three years of duration and can be renewed at the most three times. 7 Fixed-term workers are entitled to severance pay equal to 3 days for each month of employment (2 days if the employment relationship lasted less than six months). Severance pay was changed to 20
days for each year of employment for new contracts from 2012. The dismissal advance notice period remained at 15 days. The law that regulates …xed-term contracts is applied to all quali…cations and occupations and across all …rms and industries. 8 The severance pay for open-ended contracts is one month for each year of seniority (20 days from 2012), with a minimum of 3 months; and the advance notice period is at least 2 months. 9 But the largest di¤erence between the two types of employment contract is in the bureaucratic and monetary costs to terminate a contract, which are very signi…cant for permanent contracts, involving court procedures, legal and administrative costs. Portugal has the highest value of the OECD employment protection index for permanent contracts throughout the period of our analysis (the U.S. have the lowest value). 6 Parts of the LC were subject to changes over the following years, and a new LC was approved in 2009 (Law 7/2009), and revised in 2011 (Law 53/2011). 7 If these limits are reached, the …rm would have to either dismiss the workers or move them to an open-ended contract. The rationale for this is that if the employment relation reaches the maximum legal limit, the …rm's requirement would be for a permanent rather than for a temporary worker. 8 The general law in the Labor Code can be overruled by Instruments of Collective Regulation of Labor (IRCT) -agreements signed by unions and employers a¤ecting workers employed in the particular industry or …rm for which the agreement is established (depending on the instrument). However, IRCTs override the Labor Code only if they establish more favorable conditions to the workers (Principle of the most favorable treatment, Labor Code, art. 4, 2003; art. 476, 2009) . 9 This was changed from 2010 to 15 days if seniority is less than a year; 30 days if it is between 1 and 5 years; 60 days if between 5 and 10 years; and 75 days if it is 10 years or more. Table 1 shows the total number of permanent and …xed-term workers hired in each year over the period. Portuguese …rms hired on average 442,000 workers, and on average 62 percent of new hires were under a …xed-term contract. Appendix Table A [ Table 1 about here] Our main goal is to investigate whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires for …nancially constrained …rms. Therefore, the main …rm-level dependent variables in our speci…cations are the share of …xed-term hires in total hires and the ratio of …xed-term over permanent hires.
We also use as alternative dependent variables the shares of …xed-term or permanent hires in total …rm employment. In some of our speci…cations, we use the share of …xed-term workers in total employment and the ratio of …xed-term over permanent employment.
Appendix Table A .1 reports summary statistics for these variables.
We identify permanent and …xed-term hires by combining information in the QP data on the workers'"type of employment contract" and "hiring date" in the …rm. For each …rm-year we then compute the number of new hires with a …xed-term employment contract and the number of hires with a permanent employment contract to obtain the shares of …xed-term new hires within a …rm. As shown in 
Measures of …nancial constraints
We require measures of …nancial dependence to identify di¤erential e¤ects of the crisis for …nancially constrained …rms. Our empirical strategy exploits di¤erences in vulnerability to credit availability across industries and uses the global …nancial crisis of 2008-9 as a shock to credit supply. Previous research has shown that some industries are more …n-ancially dependent than others. First, …rms in some industries have substantially larger liquidity needs, for example, because of the initial project scale, the requirement for continuing investment, or the cash harvest period (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; RZ hereafter).
As discussed in RZ, technological di¤erences across industries in their dependence on external …nance re ‡ect intrinsic properties of the industries and persist across countries and time. Second, …rms in sectors that are intrinsically associated with more tangible We use the common proxies for a sector's …nancial vulnerability: external …nance dependence, asset tangibility, and the importance of trade credit, as well as the HP size-age index and precrisis reliance on short-term debt. We compute industry measures of …nancial vulnerability using balance sheet data, from the SCIE and the IEH, and employer-employee data for Portuguese …rms. The measures are obtained for the period preceding the crisis, so that the e¤ect of the …nancial crisis on …rm behavior does not contaminate the industry measures of …nancial vulnerability. We follow the literature in computing the measures of liquidity and tangibility. We …rst calculate …nancial vulnerability at the …rm-level as an average measure over the precrisis period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) for all …rms in the data. 10 We then use the median value across all …rms within a 2-digit ISIC rev 3.1 industry as the measure of …nancial dependence.
External …nance dependence (extf in) is measured by the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations. Asset tangibility (tang) is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. The measure of trade credit (tcred) is the ratio of total accounts payable over total cost of goods sold, following Love et al. (2007) . 11 This re ‡ects access to credit that …rms receive from suppliers instead of making up-front payments for supplies. These industry measures are widely regarded as technologically determined characteristics of an industry, intrinsic to the industry and exogenous from the perspective of an individual …rm. In particular, the RZ measure of external …nance dependence has been extensively used in the literature. 12 We obtain the size-age index (SA) of …nancial constraints for the …rms in our sample as in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Size is measured by the log of in ‡ation adjusted book assets and age is the number of years of the …rm. 13 The index shows that …nancial constraints fall as young and small …rms mature and grow. Finally, we also use …rms' precrisis reliance on short-term debt to measure …nancial vulnerability. Firms that rely more heavily on short-term debt during the precrisis period are more likely to be vulnerable to the crisis, relative to …rms with more long-term debt, since following the crisis banks are less able to roll over short-term debt. We compute average precrisis short-term debt ratios (short-term debt/total debt) at the …rm-level from …rms'balance sheet data. Claessens and Laeven (2003) on the relation between …nancial development, property rights protection and growth; among many other. 13 HP estimate ordered logit models, for the sample of …rms in Compustat, where a …rm's qualitatively determined …nancial constraint status is modeled as a function of size and age. The authors then use the estimates on size and age to create the SA index of …nancial constraints. The HP index is calculated as (-0.737 Size) + (0.043 Size 2 ) -(0.040 Age). Size is winsorized (capped) at $4.1 billion, and age at 37 years to re ‡ect a ‡at relation between …nancial constraints and these variables for very large/mature …rms. By construction, …nancially more constrained …rms have higher SA index.
14 The HP SA index and the short-term debt ratios are computed over the 2002-2006 period, as data coverage is larger for these measures from 2002. All of the results remain robust to using the 1997-2006 period to compute these average measures.
ancial dependence. They test this conjecture by including an industry-level sales growth interaction in the Rajan and Zingales'original speci…cation. They …nd that this growth measure is statistically signi…cant, emphasizing the role of global growth opportunities. Therefore, to take into account …rms'growth in the precrisis period, we follow Fisman and Love (2007) and include a sales growth interaction in our empirical speci…cations.
The real sales growth measure is obtained following the same RZ methodology as for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We compute average real sales growth over the precrisis period for each …rm and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level sales growth rates. 15 To identify di¤erential e¤ects of the crisis for …nancially constrained …rms, we split the sample into …rms with high and low …nancing constraints, de…ning dichotomous variables 
Empirical strategy
To study the relationship between …nancing constraints and the employment decisions of …rms with respect to the use …xed-term or permanent employment contracts after the crisis, we implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. The aim is to investigate whether …rms in industries with high …nancial constraints increase their share of …xed-term hires disproportionately after the crisis, compared to …rms in industries with low …nancial vulnerability, since the …nancial crisis reduced the availability of external credit.
Hence, we estimate speci…cations of the form:
where the dependent variable, Y jst , is the employment level or, most importantly, the share of …xed-term workers hired in total or permanent hires (or employment) of …rm j in industry s, and year t. Crisis t is an indicator variable for the crisis period, taking the Love, 2007). Similar to the F inV uln measures, we de…ne a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median in terms of precrisis sales growth, and zero otherwise.
jt is a vector of …rm characteristics, such as lagged (ln of) sales (in real terms), legal structure, whether the …rm is foreign-owned or multiplant. We also include sets of …xed e¤ects to control for general trends, d t , and for …rm time-invariant unobserved characteristics, d j , which may a¤ect …rms'mix between …xed-term and permanent workers. When we include year dummies and …rm …xed e¤ects, the stand-alone crisis dummy variable, Crisis t , and the F inV uln s measure are absorbed by these sets of …xed e¤ects, and are therefore not included. jst is a random disturbance term. In all empirical speci…cations, standard errors are clustered by …rm.
Given the …xed e¤ects and covariates included, the coe¢ cient of interest, on the interaction between the crisis dummy and the …nancial dependence measure, Crisis t F inV uln s , is interpreted as the di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion of …xed-term hires for …rms in industries with above-median …nancial dependence, relative to …rms in other industries (after controlling for precrisis growth). We expect the coe¢ cient on the external …nance dependence interaction to be positive if …rms in industries that rely more on external funds increased the share of …xed-term hires disproportionately after the crisis. Similarly, we expect the coe¢ cient on the HP size-age index interaction and that on the short-term debt ratio interaction to be positive if higher …nancial constraints, measured by those variables, are associated with an increased relative use of …xed-term workers after the crisis.
Regarding the measure of client-supplier (trade) credit, on the one hand this type of credit may have been an alternative to credit from …nancial institutions, alleviating the e¤ects of the crisis. 17 On the other hand, …nancially vulnerable …rms may be less willing to extend trade credit to their clients after the …nancial crisis, propagating its e¤ects through credit networks (Love et al., 2007). Therefore, the coe¢ cient could be positive or negative. The coe¢ cient on the asset tangibility interaction is expected to be negative if …rms are able to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain external …nance after the crisis. However, the 2008 …nancial crisis was accompanied by a sharp decline in the value of commercial real estate holdings of …rms. This may have ampli…ed the e¤ects of the …nancial shock for …rms dependent on pledgeable assets to access external …nancing. For example, Kleiner (2015) shows that the decline of the housing sector explains 10 percent of the 2007-9 unemployment in the UK. 18 Therefore, given the issues associated with the measures of tangibility and trade credit after the 2008-9 crisis, our preferred measures of …nancial constraints are the external …nance dependence, once precrisis sales growth is accounted for, the HP SA index and the reliance on short-term debt.
We also use data at the worker-level to investigate whether workers hired by …rms in industries with higher …nancial vulnerability were more likely to be hired with a temporary employment contract after the crisis, relative to comparable workers hired by …rms with lower …nancial vulnerability. To that end, using the sample of workers that were hired during the period of our analysis, we estimate a linear model for the probability that a worker is hired with a …xed-term employment contract. That is, we estimate the following speci…cation:
where the dependent variable is the probability of a …xed-term hiring contract. The estimation sample includes observations for each worker only for the years when the worker is newly hired by a …rm. Therefore, f ixed-term ijst is equal to one if worker i was hired by …rm j (in industry s) in year t with a …xed-term contract, and is equal to zero if the worker was hired with a permanent contract. Z it is a vector of worker characteristics, including the workers'gender, level of education attained, potential labor market experience (and its square), level of skill, and whether the worker is a foreign national.
X jt is a vector of …rm characteristics, as before. We also include sets of …xed effects, d(:), to control for general trends, as well as for …rm or worker time-invariant unobserved characteristics. Because some workers were hired more than once over the period, we are able to estimate speci…cations that control for worker …xed e¤ects. The other variables are as de…ned above. The coe¢ cient of interest, on the interaction term Crisis F inV uln, captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the probability of a …xed-term hiring contract, for workers hired by …rms in industries with above-median …nancial constraints, relative to those hired by other …rms, controlling for all workers'
and …rms'characteristics, including sales growth.
Results

E¤ect of the crisis on …rms'total employment
We start by investigating the e¤ect of the 2008-9 crisis on …rm total employment. We regress the log of employment at the …rm-year level on the crisis dummy variable, Crisis t .
We control for industry or …rm …xed e¤ects to absorb any systematic di¤erences across industries or …rms that may a¤ect employment outcomes. The results are reported in Table 2 . We …nd that …rm-level employment declined after the crisis, both within …rms and across …rms within an industry. These results are consistent with recent studies that document overall employment decreases after the crisis (e.g. Chodorow-Reich, 2014;
Greenstone et al., 2014).
[ Table 2 about here]
Next, we assess whether there are di¤erential employment e¤ects for …rms in industries with intrinsically higher external …nance dependence, SA index, short-term debt ratios, lower dependence on trade credit, or lower shares of collateralizable assets. We estimate a speci…cation similar to Eq. (1), with the log of employment as the dependent variable.
The results are reported in Table 3 . Even-numbered columns control for precrisis sales growth, as explained in the previous section. All columns include …rm …xed e¤ects, thus controlling for unobserved …rm characteristics, and in particular for any systematic di¤erences across …rms in the treatment and control groups. The coe¢ cient of interest is that on the interaction Crisis t F inV uln ab-med , which is interpreted as the di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on employment for …rms in industries with above-median …nancial dependence, relative to those in industries below-median. The stand-alone F inV uln ab-med term is absorbed by the …rm …xed e¤ects. In Panel A we include the stand-alone Crisis variable for a more clear interpretation of the e¤ect of the crisis, whilst in Panel B we control for year …xed-e¤ects which account for global trends, a¤ecting all …rms, and thus absorb the stand-alone Crisis variable. The results remain robust in both panels.
We …nd that …rm employment was reduced after the crisis on average, while …rms in industries with above-median dependence on external …nance, SA index or precrisis reliance on short-term debt reduced employment by less compared to other …rms. The coef…cients on the interaction term between the crisis dummy and the …nancial dependence measures reported in columns (1) through (6) of the table are positive and statistically signi…cant. A hypothesis to explain this result is that since …rms with higher …nancing needs require greater productivity to increase the value of internally generated funds, they used the more productive permanent workers more intensively before the crisis. 19 As a result, in a labor market with strict employment protection legislation against dismissal of permanent workers, the overall employment e¤ects of the crisis would have been less pronounced. We provide evidence for this hypothesis below.
Columns (7) through (10) of Table 3 report results for the importance of buyer-supplier credit (tcred) and asset tangibility (tang) as (potentially inverse) measures of …nancial vulnerability. We …nd that …rms in industries with above-median tangible asset shares or access to trade credit experienced a larger reduction in employment after the crisis relative to other …rms. As discussed above, credit constrained upstream …rms may have been less willing to extend credit to their clients after the crisis thus propagating its e¤ects through client-supplier networks and magnifying the employment e¤ects (see Love et al., 2007) .
Moreover, …rms'ability to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain external …nance may have been dampened by the sharp decline in the value of commercial real estate holdings of …rms following the collateral shocks (see Kleiner, 2015) . Given the issues associated with using asset tangibility and trade credit as inverse measures of …nancial vulnerability in the context of the 2008-9 crisis, our preferred measures of …nancial constraints are extf in, the HP SA index, and reliance on short-term debt. In the following sections we focus on those measures to investigate the role of …nancial vulnerability on the relative use of …xed-term labor after the crisis.
[ Table 3 about here]
Appendix Table A .4 provides evidence for the hypothesis discussed above that …nan-cially constrained …rms hired more permanent workers prior to the crisis and given strict EPL for these workers, decreased employment by less in the aftermath of the crisis. We regress the precrisis average share of permanent hires in total employment at the …rm level on the measures of …nancial vulnerability. We control for …rm characteristics and for the real sales growth measure, as before. Continuous measures of …nancial vulnerability are used in odd-numbered columns and the indicator variables for above-median vulnerability in even-numbered columns. We obtain positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the three measures of …nancial constraints. 20 That is, over the precrisis period …rms with higher or above-median …nancial vulnerability had higher shares of permanent workers.
Since the crisis was largely unanticipated, …nancially constrained …rms had an incentive to hire the more productive permanent workers to increase the value of internally generated funds. The high dismissal costs and strict employment protection laws for permanent workers may have resulted in …rms hoarding these workers and experiencing a lower decrease in employment after the crisis. This could have induced …nancially constrained …rms to increase the share of …xed-term hires after the crisis in order to retain ‡exibility to adjust future employment. We investigate how the crisis a¤ected the proportion of …xed-term hiring for …nancially constrained …rms in the remainder of the paper.
E¤ect of the crisis on …xed-term employment: …rm-level
This section presents the main results of the paper. We are interested in identifying how …nancial constraints a¤ected …rms' decision to hire …xed-term versus permanent workers after the crisis, and thus the share of …xed-term hires and employment within …rms.
We investigate whether …rms in more …nancially vulnerable industries hire a larger proportion of …xed-term workers with respect to permanent workers after the crisis, given the increased uncertainty and the ‡exibility of …xed-term contracts to adjust future employment. To that end, we estimate Eq. (1) using alternative dependent variables to measure the proportion of …xed-term hiring contracts within a …rm. We use information in the matched employer-employee data on each worker's hiring date in the …rm, and on their "type of employment contract" (…xed-term or permanent) to compute the shares of …xed-term new hires at the …rm-year level.
21 Table 4 reports results from estimating Eq. (1) for two alternative dependent variables: the share of …xed-term workers hired in total new hires by the …rm (Panel A), and the ratio of …xed-term to permanent new hires (Panel B). In odd-numbered columns we include the interaction term of main interest, Crisis t F inV uln s , and in evennumbered columns we additionally include the interaction with precrisis real sales growth, 20 Except when using the indicator variable for the short-term debt ratio (column 6). 21 In addition to …xed-term and permanent contracts, the variable "type of employment contract" includes the categories: "other" and "ingnored". We exclude from our analysis observations in those categories, which account for only about 1% of observations. Crisis t Salesg s . The latter accounts for …rms'growth opportunities, which might otherwise be captured by the external …nance dependence measure (see Fisman and Love, 2007) . We also control for …rm and year …xed-e¤ects in all speci…cations, and for …rms' observable characteristics, as discussed in previous sections. The standard errors are always clustered by …rm.
In Panel A of Table 4 we obtain a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the Crisis t F inV uln s interaction for the measure of external …nance dependence (column 1). That is, after the crisis …rms with above-median dependence on external …nance increase the proportion of …xed-term hires in total hires relative to …rms with below-median dependence. This result is obtained when controlling for …rm …xed e¤ects, which absorb any di¤erential hiring preferences and policies of …rms, as well as any other unobserved …rm characteristics. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is economically signi…cant, implying a di¤erential increase of 1.6 percentage points in the share of …xed-term hires for …rms with above-median dependence on external …nance, relative to other …rms. This corresponds to a 2.9 percent increase relative to the sample mean of 54.4 percent, reported in Table A These results are obtained both across …rms within an industry and within …rms after the onset of the …nancial crisis. 22 The …nding that …nancially constrained …rms increase the share of …xed-term hires in total hires following the crisis suggests that they value more highly the ‡exibility of the …xed-term contracts than unconstrained …rms. To deal with increased uncertainty and expectation of future …nancing constraints, those …rms hire a larger proportion of …xed-term workers, as they o¤er greater ‡exibility to adjust employment following a negative shock, given the lower …ring costs associated with this type of contract.
[ Table 4 about here]
The remaining columns of Table 4 report results for the two additional measures of …nancial constraints: the HP size-age index (columns 3-4) and the short-term debt 22 Results with industry …xed e¤ects instead of …rm …xed e¤ects, and including all other controls and …xed-e¤ects, are reported in appendix Table A.5. As shown, the results remain robust; we continue to obtain positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the interaction terms of main interest. That is, …nancially constrained …rms increased the share of …xed-term hires after the crisis, relative to unconstrained …rms. ratio (columns 5-6). The SA index captures the fact that …nancial constraints fall as young and small …rms mature and grow. By construction more …nancially constrained …rms have higher SA index. The short-term debt ratio captures the fact that …rms with high precrisis reliance on short-term debt are more likely to be vulnerable to the crisis.
We continue to obtain positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the interaction term of main interest for both these measures. This shows that …rms in industries with above-median SA index or reliance on short-term debt precrisis experienced a larger e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion of …xed-term hires, relative to other …rms. Again, controlling for precrisis sales growth does not signi…cantly a¤ect the coe¢ cient on the Crisis t F inV uln s interaction.
Panel B of Table 4 uses as dependent variable the ratio of …xed-term over permanent hires at the …rm-year level, conditional on …rms hiring permanent workers. The results are consistent with those reported in Panel A. In particular, we continue to …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the Crisis t F inV uln s interaction for the three measures of …nancial vulnerability. That is, …rms with above-median reliance on external …nance, short-term debt or SA index increase the proportion of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires after the crisis, relative to …rms below-median.
Next, we try to disentangle whether the positive e¤ect on the share of …xed-term hiring reported above is driven by an increase in …xed-term hires, or by a reduction in permanent hiring after the crisis. To that end, Table 5 reports results from estimating Eq. (1) using four alternative dependent variables: the ratio of …xed-term hires over total employment, the ratio of permanent hires over total employment and the number of workers hired with a …xed-term and with a permanent contract, at the …rm-year level.
Results for the three measures of …nancial constraints are reported across the columns of the table. Even-numbered columns report results that control for the precrisis sales growth interaction. Panel A shows that there is a positive and statistically signi…cant di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the share of …xed-term hires in total employment for …rms with above-median …nancial dependence, relative to those below-median. This is found for all measures of …nancial vulnerability.
[ Table 5 Table 5 con…rm that the positive e¤ect on …xed-term hiring shares is driven by an increase in …xed-term hires. Table 6 reports results for the e¤ect on the stock of …xed-term workers rather than [ Table 6 about here]
In sum, the results in this section are consistent with the interpretation that …nancing constraints play a role in …rms'decision in terms of employment composition and the mix between …xed-term and permanent workers. In particular, …nancing constraints induced …rms to hire a larger proportion of …xed-term workers relative to permanent workers after the …nancial crisis. We …nd robust evidence that …rms in industries with above-median dependence on external …nance increased the share of …xed-term hiring contracts. This is consistent with the hypothesis that di¢ culty in accessing capital markets following the crisis led …nancially constrained …rms to place a higher value on the ‡exibility of …xed-term workers to adjust future employment, given the higher uncertainty.
E¤ect of the crisis on …xed-term employment: worker-level
In this section we exploit worker-level information to investigate whether workers hired by …rms in industries characterized by intrinsically higher …nancial vulnerability were more likely to be hired with a …xed-term contract after the crisis, relative to comparable workers hired by …rms in industries with lower …nancial vulnerability. For that purpose, we use the sample of workers that were hired during the period of analysis, and estimate a model for the probability of a …xed-term hiring contract. We estimate Eq. (2), where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the worker was hired with a …xed-term contract in year t, and zero if hired with a permanent contract. 23 Since we include …rm or worker …xed e¤ects, along with year …xed e¤ects, we obtain OLS estimates given concerns of biases arising from nonlinear estimates with …xed-e¤ects. Our estimates control for the same …rm-level observable characteristics as before, and additionally for worker characteristics: gender, educational level, skill level, experience and its square, and whether the worker is a foreign national. Table 7 reports results for the three measures of …nancial vulnerability: external …n-ance dependence, SA index, and reliance on short-term debt. In Panel A we include …rm …xed e¤ects, along with year …xed e¤ects and observable …rm and worker characteristics.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the post-crisis dummy and extf in, the RZ measure of external …nance dependence, is positive and statistically signi…cant (columns 1 and 2). That is, workers hired by …rms in industries with above-median dependence on external …nance are more likely to be employed with a …xed-term contract after the crisis, than workers hired by …rms in industries with below-median dependence. The results remain robust when we control for the real sales growth interaction. The point estimate of 0.031 implies that the impact of the crisis was to increase the probability of a …xed-term hiring contract by 3.1 percentage points for workers hired by …rms in industries with above-median dependence on external funds, relative to comparable workers hired by other …rms. This corresponds to a 5 percent increase relative to the sample mean of 64.8 percent, reported in Table A. 3.
[ Table 7 about here]
Columns (3) and (4) report results for the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) SA index. We …nd that workers hired in industries where …rms have a higher size-age index, and thus are 23 The sample includes observations for a worker only for the years when the worker was newly hired by a …rm. …nancially more vulnerable, were more likely to be hired with a …xed-term contract after the crisis. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term of main interest remains positive and statistically signi…cant after controlling for real sales growth, and is of similar magnitude to that for the extf in measure.
The results in columns (5) and (6) are for the measure of …nancial vulnerability based on …rms'precrisis reliance on short-term debt. Consistent with the other two measures, we obtain a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient on the interaction with the crisis dummy. This implies an increased probability of a …xed-term hiring contract after the crisis for workers hired by …rms with heavier reliance on short-term debt.
Panel B of Table 7 presents results that control for worker …xed e¤ects, in addition to the other variables and controls discussed above. The fact that some workers were hired more than once over the period of analysis allows us to obtain estimates that control for potential biases arising from workers' unobserved time-invariant characteristics, which could be related to the probability of being hired with a …xed-term contract. As shown, all the results remain robust when we control for worker …xed e¤ects. In particular, we continue to …nd that workers hired by …rms in industries with above-median dependence on external …nance, SA index, or reliance on short-term debt were more likely to be hired with a …xed-term contract after the crisis.
In sum, the results in this section, using data at the worker-level to estimate the e¤ect on the probability of a …xed-term hiring contract, are consistent with the …rm-level results reported in the previous section. They suggest that the crisis led …nancially constrained …rms to place a higher value on the ‡exibility of …xed-term workers than unconstrained …rms.
In a framework where …xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but the latter are more productive, there are two e¤ects of …nancing frictions on the composition of employment. On the one hand, …nancially constrained …rms require higher productivity, leading to an increased demand for the more productive permanent workers.
On the other hand, increased uncertainty leads to higher demand for the more ‡exible …xed-term workers. Our results suggest that following the 2008-9 crisis …rms facing …n-ancial constraints placed a higher value on the ‡exibility of …xed-term workers to adjust future employment than on the productivity gain from hiring permanent workers. This is of particular relevance given labor market rigidities in European countries.
Robustness checks 4.4.1 E¤ect of the crisis on …xed-term employment, by …rm size
Our results reported above show that following the 2008-9 crisis, …rms in industries with higher external …nance dependence increased the relative use of …xed-term employment contracts, compared to other …rms. In this section we report further robustness checks for the main results of the paper. We start by assessing the role of …nancial constraints on the share of …xed-term hiring for small versus large …rms. Although we already account for the role of size and age in …rms'…nancial vulnerability with the SA index of …nancial constraints, here we estimate the main speci…cations of the paper (reported in Table 4 ) separately for small and for large …rms. Arguably, small …rms are potentially more …nancially constrained than large …rms. Moreover, lending to small businesses was signi…cantly reduced after the onset of the crisis in many countries. 24 In Table 8 we consider the sample of micro and small …rms -…rms with less than 50 employees, in accordance with the Eurostat main …rm size-classes. As shown, we obtain results that are similar to those reported in Table 4 for the full sample of …rms.
In particular, also for small …rms, those …rms with above-median …nancial constraints -measured by external …nance dependence, reliance on short-term debt or SA indexincreased the relative use of …xed-term workers after the crisis, compared to unconstrained …rms.
[ Table 8 about here]
In Table 9 we repeat the analysis but considering the sample of medium and large …rms -those with 50 or more employees. We continue to obtain positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the Crisis t F inV uln s interaction. This …nding shows that for the sample of large …rms also, the crisis had a positive di¤erential e¤ect on the share of …xed-term hires for …rms with high …nancing constraints, relative to those with low constraints. We identify the role of …nancing constraints through the interaction term between the crisis dummy and the industry measures of external …nance dependence; this could explain the fact that the results are obtained for both large and small …rms.
In sum, the results in this section con…rm the …ndings obtained previously for the full sample of …rms: …nancially constrained …rms increase the share of …xed-term workers disproportionately after the crisis compared to unconstrained …rms.
[ Table 9 about here]
The 2001 ICT crisis as a placebo test
Our results on the e¤ect of the 2008-9 …nancial crisis on …rms' employment decisions are consistent with the role of shocks to credit supply. This section provides additional evidence that our …ndings are driven by di¤erential …nancial dependence across industries.
We perform similar analysis to that reported in previous sections, but using the 2001 recession, which was triggered by the bursting of the bubble in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector. 25 The Table 10 reports estimation results of similar speci…cations as those reported in Table   4 , with the main …ndings of the paper, but for the 2001 crisis. We continue to control for The dependent variable in Panel B is the ratio of …xed-term over permanent hires. We continue to obtain statistically insigni…cant coe¢ cients on the 2001-crisis interaction term of interest for all measures of …nancial vulnerability once we account for the sales growth interaction (even-numbered columns). Overall, the results in this section support the role of …nancing constraints in …rms'decision of whether to hire …xed-term or permanent workers following shocks to credit supply.
[ Table 10 about here]
Discussion
Our results show that …nancing constraints play a role in …rms'decision in terms of the optimal mix between …xed-term and permanent workers after the 2008-9 crisis. In particular, …nancially constrained …rms increased the share of …xed-term hiring contracts following the crisis, relative to other …rms. Our …ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that facing …nancial di¢ culties in accessing capital markets following the crisis, …nancially constrained …rms placed a higher value on the ‡exibility of …xed-term workers than …nancially unconstrained …rms. Given increased uncertainty and expectation of future …nancing constraints, this type of labor allows …rms to adjust future employment without incurring signi…cant …ring costs. In this section we discuss a framework to rationalize and interpret our results.
Caggese and Cuñat (2008) develop a model to analyze the interaction between …nan-
cing constraints, …ring costs and the hiring of …xed-term and permanent workers. Assuming that …xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but permanent workers are relatively more productive, …rms without …nancing constraints would hire permanent workers up to the point where …ring costs equal the productivity gain relative to …xed-term workers. The model predicts two opposing e¤ects of …nancing frictions on the mix between …xed-term and permanent contracts. On the one hand, …nancially constrained …rms require greater productivity to increase the value of internally generated funds; this would lead to an increased demand for the more productive permanent workers. This e¤ect is stronger if …rms expect to be less constrained in the future. On the other hand, cash-strapped …rms with expectation of future …nancing constraints value more highly the ‡exibility of …xed-term contracts, thus increasing demand for …xed-term workers.
To assess the potential trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and productivity in our data, we report in Table A .6 statistics showing that …xed-term workers have higher job separation rates and lower real hourly wages than permanent workers. Assuming that wages are perfectly correlated with productivity, the lower hourly wages of …xed-term workers would re ‡ect lower productivity. To further investigate this, Table A .7 regresses labor productivity (real sales per worker) at the …rm-year level on the share of …xed-term workers. We use continuous …xed-term employment shares or a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for observations with above-median …xed-term share, and zero otherwise.
We control for …rms' observable characteristics and include year as well as industry or …rm …xed e¤ects. Although the results do not imply causality, we …nd that larger shares of …xed-term workers are associated with lower sales per worker, both within …rms and across …rms in an industry. In sum, in our data …xed-term workers have higher job separation rates, lower real hourly wages and are associated with lower …rm productivity than permanent workers. This suggests that …rms face the two opposing e¤ects of …nan-cial frictions discussed above, and the trade-o¤ between productivity and ‡exibility when hiring new workers.
Our empirical results shed light on these two e¤ects following a shock to credit supply.
The …nding that after the 2008 crisis …nancially constrained …rms increase the proportion of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires suggests that they value the ‡exibility of …xed-term workers more highly than the larger productivity of permanent workers. 26 Future expected …nancing constraints are an important determinant of employment decisions, and …nancial frictions increase expected …ring costs, inducing …rms to hire …xed-term instead of permanent workers. This is particularly important given labor market rigidities in Europe, since …xed-term contracts o¤er the ‡exibility to adjust future employment without incurring signi…cant …ring costs.
27
The results in our paper have important policy implications given that …xed-term 26 Our results are consistent with the …ndings of Caggese and Cuñat (2008) for Italy over the 1990-2000 period. 27 Since the wages of …xed-term workers are on average lower, …nancially constrained …rms might hire relatively more …xed-term workers after the crisis also to reduce labor costs. This hypothesis is hard to establish conclusively and that is beyond the scope of this paper. Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2016) show that part-time employment is countercyclical and increased markedly in the U.S. and U.K. in the aftermath of the 2008-9 crisis. This is consistent with employers reducing labor costs during downturns by moving some full-time employees to part-time jobs. We instead focus on the choice between …xed-term and permanent workers, both of which are predominantly on full-time jobs in Portugal (average weekly hours are 39 and 40, respectively, and did not change signi…cantly over the period). However, evidence on the e¤ects of …nancial constraints, and in particular of the recent crisis, on …rms'decision regarding the composition of employment, and the mix between …xed-term and permanent workers is very scant.
We exploit the 2008-9 crisis, which a¤ected …rms di¤erently according to their precrisis dependence on external …nance, as a quasi-natural experiment. We study the link between …nancing constraints and the proportion of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires within …rms. We also estimate, at the worker level, the e¤ect of …nancing constraints on the probability of a …xed-term hiring contract after the crisis.
We use employer-employee data for the universe of private sector …rms and workers in Portugal for our analysis. Credit supply e¤ects are identi…ed by industry-level external …nance dependence (following Rajan and Zingales, 1998), the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size-age index of …nancial constraints, and reliance on short-term debt. These measures are computed over the precrisis period, to avoid changes in …rm behavior after the crisis to a¤ect the measures of …nancial vulnerability.
We …nd that …rms in industries with above-median dependence on external …nance increase the share of …xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires after the 2008-9 crisis, relative to …rms with below-median external …nance needs. We account for …rms'…xed e¤ects, which absorb unobserved characteristics and any systematic di¤erences across …rms, and for aggregate trends. Our results are robust for the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size-age index and for precrisis reliance on short-term debt. At the worker-level, workers employed by …rms in industries with above-median …nancial vulnerability are more likely to be hired with a …xed-term contract after the crisis, relative to comparable workers hired by unconstrained …rms.
In a framework where …xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but permanent workers are more productive, there are two e¤ects of …nancing frictions on the composition of employment. On the one hand, …nancially constrained …rms require higher productivity, and thus demand more permanent workers. On the other hand, expectation of future …nancing constraints leads to higher demand for the more ‡exible …xed-term workers (Caggese and Cuñat, 2008) . Our …nding that following the 2008-9 crisis …nancially constrained …rms increase the share of …xed-term hires suggests that they value the ‡exibility of …xed-term labor more highly since it allows them to adjust future employment given a negative shock.
Whilst our …ndings are based on micro-level data, they have broader relevance and policy implications. Financial constraints and the availability of credit are important determinants of …rms' employment decisions. Empirical research has found that …xed-term workers earn lower wages and have repeated spells of unemployment. The …nding that the use of these contracts increased after the crisis suggests, on the one hand, that their availability allowed …rms to continue to hire in an uncertain environment given their ‡exibility. On the other hand, it may uncover additional costs of the shock with potential long-term e¤ects in terms of decreased accumulation of human capital and productivity. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012 and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability m easures are calculated over the precrisis p erio d. EXTFIN m easures the dep endence on external …nance and is the share of total capital exp enditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from op erations (as in Ra jan and Zingales, 1998). TCRED m easures access to supplier credit and is the ratio of total accounts payable over cost of goo ds sold. TANG m easures tangible assets and is the share of net plant, prop erty and equipm ent in total b ook assets. SA index is the Hadlo ck & Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the …rm 's in ‡ation-adjusted b ook assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the numb er of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth m easure is also calculated over the precrisis p erio d Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We …rst calculate the average for each …rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level averages. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise.
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Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We …rst calculate the average for each …rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level averages. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We …rst calculate the average for each …rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level averages. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We …rst calculate the average for each …rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level averages. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. The estimation sample includes …rms with less than 50 workers in the …rst year they are observed in the sample. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We …rst calculate the average for each …rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level averages. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. The estimation sample includes …rms with 50 or more workers in the …rst year they are observed in the sample.
Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations. SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). The short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. We then construct the indicator variables for above-median …nancial vulnerability, which take the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the respective FinVuln measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The …nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external …nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not …nanced by internal cash ‡ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the …rm's in ‡ation-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the …rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other …nancial vulnerability measures. We …rst calculate the average for each …rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the …rm-level averages. F inV uln ab-med ( Salesg ab-med ) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the …rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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